Met report exposed

By Candia Dames ~ Guardian News Editor ~ candia@nasguard.com:


The two forecasters on duty at Lynden Pindling International Airport on the morning a deadly tornado hit Freeport two weeks ago, knew of the approaching severe thunderstorm activity before 8 a.m., but both failed to act on the information until it was too late, according to a closely-guarded report that reveals the details of an investigation into the matter.

In fact, when the tornado struck, killing three Freeport Container Port workers after 11 a.m., the duty forecaster in Nassau was literally out to lunch, even though that forecaster had been advised at 6:50 a.m. by the senior meteorological officer who worked the night shift that the worrisome weather system was moving toward Grand Bahama, the report indicates.

Not too long after beginning the 7 a.m. shift, the morning forecaster was able to deduce that the severe weather system would be over Grand Bahama by at least noon.

But that was apparently still not enough to prompt the forecaster to prepare a warning.

At about 7:30 a.m., the two forecasters on duty discussed the day's weather situation; however, "neither discusses the severe weather approaching Grand Bahama with each other, although each was aware of its possible impact on Grand Bahama later that morning."

According to the report, at the start of the 7 a.m. shift, the met office's lightning detection system was not working because the duty forecaster did not know how to restart it. The report shows it was eventually restarted by the second forecaster who had worked that morning.

In the minutes and hours after the tragic scene unfolded in the nation's second city, there was "widespread panic", according to Director of Meteorology Arthur Rolle, who wrote to Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of the Environment Ronald Thompson.

"Forecasters at the Department of Meteorology tracked the system using modern technology such as a lightning data network, a Doppler weather radar and satellite imagery," Rolle wrote.

"Unfortunately, no warning was issued by the department until just before noon for residents in the threatened areas. This oversight is unforgivable.

"The protocol for the issuance of warnings is that the director be informed before dissemination, or in his absence, the senior deputy director. Furthermore, the Ministry of the Environment should be informed simultaneously. The protocol was not followed. This resulted in widespread panic."

Rolle further wrote, "I would like to state emphatically that professionalism was not displayed during this episode. This is a clear indication of why the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requires meteorological personnel to be retrained."

He further advised that an urgent meeting would be called to apprise forecasters of the protocol.

"There will be some shuffling of staff," Rolle also wrote.

While the director advised that protocol was not followed on the morning of the deadly tornado, one of the two forecasters on duty at the time said in the report, "I am not aware of any protocols in place to issue severe thunderstorm warnings. I issue them when I see red (red echoes on the Doppler Weather Radar display.)"

The director, however, has attached to the report a presentation by him dated May 19, 2006, which states, "Before dissemination, all information from news items to warnings must be brought to the director's attention, or in the absence or unavailability, the senior deputy director or one of the deputy directors."

The attached presentation does not stipulate when a warning should be issued, however.

In a memo to Director Rolle on March 29, the day of the tornado strike, Deputy Director Basil Dean wrote, "We have equipped our weather forecasters with modern Doppler radar and a lightning detection network. Hence, it is inexcusable that a warning was not issued earlier."

In the report, nine forecasters and met department staff provided a detailed account of what they did on the morning and afternoon of the fateful day.

A 'synopsis of the event', which was prepared by Senior Deputy Director Trevor Basden, states that at about 10 a.m. at the Climatology Section in Oakes Field, a meteorological officer observed that severe weather would affect Bimini, Grand Bahama and Abaco.

"She alerts some in the Climatology Section on the results of the model runs, but does not contact the Forecast Office," the report states.

"Sometime after 11 a.m. a Bahamasair pilot enters the Forecast Office (at the airport) and requests a briefing for a flight to Grand Bahama.

"[The duty forecaster] used the Miami radar to bring his attention to the severe weather approaching Grand Bahama and went online and noted the 11 a.m. Freeport International Airport observation.

"Because of her previous analysis and this observation, indicating heavy thundershowers with thunderstorm clouds in all quadrants, this should have prompted [the duty forecaster] to call [the met officer who was operationally in charge of the Forecast Office that day] to begin the preparation of a severe weather statement.

"Unfortunately [the duty forecaster] then leaves to get something to eat."

The report states that a call from Administrator Don Cornish in Grand Bahama to Deputy Director Basil Dean prompted a sequence of events that provoked [the two met officers on duty] to prepare a severe weather statement.

"By such time the adverse weather had already arrived over Grand Bahama and reports of tornadoes were being received," the report says.

"However, the issued warnings remained valid for Grand Bahama until they were lifted at 5 p.m.

"Further to all of this, the directorate was not informed of the impending severe weather or that a severe weather statement had been prepared. The forecasters and observers are the 'watchmen at the gate' to inform the directorate of significant weather conditions that require a news item or a warning."

According to the report, from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m., Deputy Director Jeffrey Simmons, who has responsibility for the Forecast Office, was mainly at the department's Oakes Field headquarters in a budget preparation meeting with the director.

Basden wrote, "Due to the breakdown in protocol, the director was not informed of the issuance of the initial severe weather statement. However, when the information was received from Deputy Directors Simmons and Dean, the director went into damage control and reports were furnished to Mr. Ronald Thompson, permanent secretary, Ministry of the Environment."

The meteorological officer in charge of the Forecast Office on March 29 stated that he left the office at 2 p.m.

He said he was at home at 2:38 p.m. when the director called him on his cell phone and stated he wanted a report as to why the warnings were issued so late.

After informing of his call from the director, the forecaster stated in the report that he was not aware of any protocols in place to issue severe thunderstorm warnings.

The director stated in the report that he did not know of the severe weather affecting Grand Bahama until his return from lunch at about 2 p.m. That's three hours after severe weather was reported there and many more hours after it was spotted making its approach.

Rolle said he received a call from Permanent Secretary Thompson who informed him of the deaths of two to three people in Grand Bahama and wanted a report.

"He (Thompson) also stated that Minister [Zhivargo] Laing was concerned about it," the director stated.

He said this is when he ordered the met officer who had been in charge of the Forecast Office that morning back to work.

Rolle said he received a report from that forecaster at 3:30 p.m. and sent it to the permanent secretary.

The report into the events in the Department of Meteorology on March 29 is being viewed by top government officials and disciplinary action is expected to follow.

April 12, 2010

thenassauguardian

Bahamas Blog International